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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:icalendar-ruby
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260415T135532Z
UID:https://www.econ.mpg.de/events/36540/13670
DTSTART:20241002T140000Z
CLASS:PUBLIC
CREATED:20240117T084641Z
DESCRIPTION:Although they usually manage to combine information to make wel
 l-informed decisions\, groups also make mistakes. We investigate experimen
 tally one source of sub-optimal decision-making by groups: the selective a
 nd asymmetric sharing ofego-relevant information within teams. We show tha
 t good news about one’s performance is shared more often with team membe
 rs than bad news. Asymmetric information sharing combined with the receive
 rs’ selection neglect boosts team confidence compared to an unbiased exc
 hange of feedback. Consequently\, weaker teams make worse investment decis
 ions in bets whose success depends on the team’s ability. The endogenous
  social exchange of ego-relevant information may foster detrimental group 
 delusion.\nSpeaker: Marie-Claire Villeval (CNRS GATE Lyon)
LAST-MODIFIED:20240925T065002Z
LOCATION:MPI\, Room: Ground Floor
SUMMARY:Selective Information Sharing and Group Delusion (with Anton Suvoro
 v\, Jeroen van de Ven) 
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.econ.mpg.de/events/36540/13670
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