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DTSTAMP:20260616T215847Z
UID:https://www.econ.mpg.de/events/15658/13692
DTSTART:20180319T160000Z
CLASS:PUBLIC
CREATED:20181008T083345Z
DESCRIPTION:Revisiting the longstanding debate about contract remedies and 
 "efficient breach\," we study experimentally whether expectation damages o
 r specific performance better promote renegotiation of the contract when i
 t matters-when the seller cannot be sure whether performing his obligation
  is efficient. We hypothesize that giving the buyer a right to specific pe
 rformance enables her to disclose more private information about her valua
 tion of the good\, facilitating agreement between the parties. We test the
  hypothesis in a first experiment with one-sided asymmetric information: t
 he seller's cost of performance is commonly known but the buyer's valuatio
 n is private information. The experimental design aims at insulating the i
 ncentive effect\, stripping away the contractual context to neutralize the
  players' normative preconceptions. The results lend some support to the a
 dvantages of specific performance. They also suggest that those advantages
  will become more prominent under two-sided asymmetric information\, which
  we intend to test in a second experiment.\nSpeaker: Andreas Engert
LAST-MODIFIED:20181008T083524Z
LOCATION:MPI\, Room: Ground Floor
SUMMARY:The inefficiency of efficient breach: Contract renegotiation under 
 asymmetric Information 
URL;VALUE=URI:https://www.econ.mpg.de/events/15658/13692
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